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FDA REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS AS
TORT STANDARDS
Richard Merrill*
INTRODUCTION
There are essentially two contexts in which laws encounter
agency-produced and agency-analyzed science. One is in the
context of reviewing regulatory decisions—a context governed at
the federal level by the Administrative Procedure Act, at the state
level by state administrative procedure acts, and sometimes by
specific statutes that authorize domestic regulatory activity.
Appellate judges may encounter, and federal judges surely do
encounter, cases in which a party is petitioning for direct review of
an agency science-based decision. Trial judges however, are much
more likely to encounter agency-assessed science in a second
context—private litigation in which the work of a regulatory body
is claimed to be either irrelevant, or highly pertinent, to the
disposition of the case. Therefore, this paper will focus on
regulation of products that often give rise to claims for civil
liability.
In confronting such claims, judges and juries address many
complicated scientific questions bearing on whether a product is
capable of causing the kind of harm that the plaintiff experienced
and whether the use of or exposure to the product caused the harm
that the particular plaintiff is suffering from.
Beyond causation, there are also questions about whether the
manufacturer or discharger of the product took the precautions that
were necessary to minimize or reduce the risk associated with its
* A.B., M.A., LL.B.; Daniel Caplain Professor of Law at the University of
Virginia School of Law.
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production or use. This is the question of breach of duty. This
inquiry has two dimensions—what precautions were in fact taken,
and what precautions did the responsible regulatory agency require
to be taken to minimize the risks. These questions—involving
knowledge about risk and measures taken to avoid risk—are as
important as the questions about causation.
Most of the products that give rise to tort claims in today’s
America are at least potentially regulable by some federal agency,
sometimes by both a federal and counterpart state regulatory
agency. But these targets of litigation are not all subject to the
same level or type of regulation, as can be seen with both the Food
& Drug Administration (FDA) and Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA).1 These two agencies are possibly the most
important public health regulatory agencies operating in
Washington. The FDA has been in business for ninety-eight years.2
The EPA’s experience is much briefer but it is surely the most
science-dependent regulatory agency in Washington. Most of the
products or pollutants that give rise to civil claims today fall within
the jurisdiction of one of these two agencies.
My immediate aims are quite modest. I hope, first, to get you
to think about how the duty that the civil justice system might
impose upon product manufacturers or pollutant dischargers
should be looked at in light of the regulatory requirements the
manufacturer or the discharger was subject to. Second, I want to
demonstrate that regulatory systems are not all the same in their
expectation for care-taking.
The horn book law in this area of civil liability is
straightforward. We all remember it from our torts class. Violation
of a regulatory standard is negligence (or some form of “fault”) per
se in almost every jurisdiction in the United States.3 If the
1

See Michael A. Friedman, M.D., What Is the Value of an FDA Approval
in a Judicial Matter?, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 559 (2004); Robert S. Sussman, Science
and EPA Decision-Making, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 573 (2004).
2
21 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (2003). The FDA was empowered by the Food and
Drugs Act of 1906, which was supplanted by the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetics Act of 1938.
3
AARON D. TWERSKI, JAMES A. HENDERSON, TORTS: CASES AND
MATERIALS (Aspen Law & Business 2003).
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defendant failed to take precautions that a regulatory agency
required, this will usually end the inquiry into whether the
defendant fulfilled its civil law responsibility. There is a
counterpart proposition of narrower reach, namely that compliance
with regulatory requirements is admissible as evidence of due care,
but it is not conclusive.4 These companion propositions assume,
and many cases say, that regulatory standards are minimum
standards, i.e., the least that the legal system is entitled to expect,
but not necessarily all that the legal system is entitled to expect.
Roughly a decade ago the American Law Institute (ALI)
undertook a study of product and process injuries.5 This was not a
“Restatement” exercise, but the resulting report purported to be a
synthesis and critique of legal developments in an arena now come
to be known as product liability or toxic torts. The project was
headed by some of the ablest scholars now working in the United
States, including Robert Rabin of Stanford Law School, and
Richard Stewart, now of New York University.6 The report they
produced for the ALI suggested that in some circumstances, most
pertinently in suits involving FDA-approved prescription drugs,
regulatory requirements should be understood as the authoritative
assessment of the benefits and risks of a product and express the
legal system agency’s authoritative judgment about how best to
minimize those risks. If the agency had access to all of the
evidence about the product’s risks that was later available in a
lawsuit, a holding that the manufacturer should have taken
additional precautions would create conflict between the common
law tort system, on the one hand, and the regulatory system that
Congress has established for guarding against and minimizing
product and process injuries.7
4

Id.
AM. LAW INST., REPORTERS’ STUDY ON ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
PERSONAL INJURY (1991) (the Project on Compensation and Liability for
Product and Process Injuries, later renamed the Project on Enterprise
Responsibility for Personal Injury).
6
Id. See also Robert Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 GEO.
L. J. 2049 (2000); Richard B. Stewart, Regulatory Compliance Preclusion of
Tort Liability: Limiting the Dual-Track System, 88 GEO. L. J. 2167 (2000).
7
AM. LAW INST., supra note 5.
5

MERRILLMACRO.DOC

552

4/23/2004 12:52 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

The immediate question is: Do those observations have any
relevance in the context of the work that FDA does today?
The FDA administers one basic statute: the Federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act, enacted in 1938.8 It has been amended
numerous times since then to expand the regulatory expectations
for products under FDA’s aegis, but these amendments have not
fundamentally changed the scope of the agency’s regulatory
responsibilities. Those responsibilities are framed by five product
categories for which the regulatory system has very different kinds
of expectations.
The five product categories are cosmetics, food, therapeutic
drugs, medical devices, and, finally, dietary supplements, a fifth
category created by statute in 1994.9 These five categories
encompass many of the products that give rise to civil lawsuits in
the United States today. Drugs and medical devices lead the list.
We do not have many tort claims challenging the safety of food
substances and relatively few involving the safety of cosmetics.
The descriptions that follow are general. They do not take
account of the possibility that in a particular case the basic
requirements I have ascribed to FDA may not have been omitted or
might have been added to.
1. Cosmetics
In regulating cosmetics, the agency functions like a highway
patrolman. Its inspectors look out for products that are dangerous
to health, about which it can, like a highway patrol man, do
something. That something is to initiate administrative or judicial
enforcement action on the premise that the product is not as safe as
the law expects it to be, or that the product is not labeled as the law
expects it to be labeled.10
In a nutshell, what the law says to a cosmetics manufacturer is:
“Don’t injure and don’t mislead buyers of your products.” The law
8

21 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1938).
21 U.S.C. § 301 (1997).
10
PETER BARTON HUTT & RICHARD A. MERRILL, FOOD & DRUG LAW:
CASES & MATERIALS (2d ed. 1991).
9
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FDA administers imposes no obligation on cosmetic manufacturers
to do any testing of the products. Of course, manufacturers
routinely do testing, but that is not because FDA demands it. Nor
does the law give FDA any authority to evaluate the results of the
manufacturer’s testing before the product goes on the market. FDA
regulation of cosmetics is entirely ex post.
2. Food
With an important exception, each of the foregoing statements
about FDA’s regulation of cosmetics describes its regulation of
food. A seller of food may put it on the market, after whatever
testing it believes it prudent to do, without ever contacting FDA.
The law says that food can not harm consumers and FDA may take
measures after the fact to curtail the marketing of food that it
believes harmful. FDA’s labeling requirements for food are more
elaborate than for cosmetics, but they too can be summarized as
saying: “Don’t mislead and don’t lie about the composition or
utility of your product.”
Again, in regulating foods substances, FDA functions like a
highway patrol officer. The agency devoted substantial resources
to this activity. Hundreds of FDA inspectors are engaged in
investigating food establishments. They occasionally visit grocery
stores. They follow up reports of food poisoning and the like. But
FDA does not have authority to require pre-market approval for
food products.
The notable exception is for new food ingredients, which under
the law are defined as “food additives.” Imagine someone who
hopes to develop and market a new non-nutritive sweetener—
something lower in calories than sugar, perhaps with other useful
traits. The FDEC Act requires that the developer of this sweetener
go to FDA and secure agency approval of its safety.11 Utility is left
to the marketplace, but safety is the FDA’s judgment. It is a
judgment made in advance of the introduction of any new food
ingredient.
However, for reasons that will be obvious on a moment’s
11

21 U.S.C. § 349 (2003).
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reflection, the FDA’s safety judgment will not ordinarily be based
on human evidence. It is generally considered unethical to conduct
experiments of a new chemical in human subjects unless the
chemical offers some therapeutic benefit. Thus, while we do test
drugs in human subjects we do not test food additives in human
beings before they enter the marketplace.
The law requires the sweetener inventor to conduct elaborate
long-term animal feeding experiments designed to explore possible
ways in which the substance might be harmful to human beings.12
The FDA may then restrict the level or frequency of its use,
extrapolating from the results in laboratory animals.
3. Therapeutic Drugs
My third category is therapeutic drugs. The law’s requirements
for drugs are quite different than those for cosmetics and food—
and the differences should matter to judges.
All new drugs require FDA approval for safety and
effectiveness before they may be marketed. Since all drugs have
side effects—some rare, some mild, some frequent—that need to
be guarded against, a central feature of FDA approval is the label,
with its instructions and warnings, that the agency prescribes at the
time that it approves the product.
When FDA approves a new drug for marketing, it is making a
judgment about relative benefit and risk, and it mandates the
instructions—conventionally directed to the physician, not to the
patient—about measures necessary to minimize risks and
maximize benefits. The agency’s approval of a drug represents a
judgment that the product, when used in accordance with the label
instructions, is reasonably safe, taking into account its medical
benefit.
In contrast with its approval of a food additive, FDA approval
of a drug is based on randomized clinical trials in human beings.
Such trials may extend over months or even years. Perhaps as
many as 5,000, possibly even 10,000, patients will have been
exposed to the drug and their experience analyzed before the FDA
12

Id.

MERRILLMACRO.DOC

4/23/2004 12:52 PM

FDA REGULATION AND TORT LITIGATION

555

is prepared to judge the drug safe and effective. The results of
these clinical studies are carefully reviewed by the agency, and
their design and conduct are often reviewed in advance.13
FDA can revise the terms of its initial approval of a drug by
requiring changes in the labeling or, less often, in the composition
of the product. Manufacturers must submit to FDA information
that they receive about experience with the drug that suggests the
risks are greater or different than originally anticipated. The legal
duty to report adverse events applies only to manufacturers, but
information about post-approval experience also comes to the FDA
from physicians, health care providers, and not infrequently from
public health authorities in other countries. In short, FDA
regulation of drugs involves a kind of ongoing oversight that is not
true of cosmetics or foods, or even food additives.
Over-the-counter (OTC) drugs could be thought of as a special
case. However, most of the non-prescriptions drugs that have been
introduced in the last fifteen years first came onto the market
through the FDA approval process for prescription drugs.14
4. Medical Devices
Medical devices, which give rise to civil claims with some
frequency, are subject to a different set of regulating requirements
than applies to drugs. The FDEC Act’s requirements for devices
were dramatically expended in 1976.15 The differences between
the requirements for devices and these for drugs potentially have
implications for the civil liability system.
There are two pathways by which a new medical device can
come onto the marketplace. One looks very much like the process
by which a new prescription drug gains FDA approval. Approval
requires a finding that the device is safe and effective—or, more
accurately, provides benefits that outweigh its risks. FDA approval
is based on the results of clinical trials in randomized human
subjects, whose data are submitted to, and closely evaluated by,
13
14
15

See Friedman, supra note 1.
HUTT & MERRILL, supra note 10.
21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2003).
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FDA. For example, a new implant of almost any sort is likely to
have gone through this premarket approval (PMA) process.
But the law requires another pathway to the market for devices
that represent modest advances on the existing technology. For
such devices the law affords a less rigorous path to the market,
known as the 510K or pre-market notification process. To follow
this pathway the maker must give the FDA advance notice of its
plan to market the product and demonstrate, not that the product is
safe and effective based on clinical studies, but that it is
“substantially equivalent” to an existing device. This is a
significantly less rigorous burden than required by the PMA
process.
Several years ago, in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, Justice Stevens
provided a lucid description of these two statutory pathways and
emphasized how they differ with respect to the question of whether
compliance with FDA’s requirements should afford a defense to
tort liability.16 The Medtronic case arose because the medical
device law, uniquely, contains a feature of special relevance to our
inquiry: Congress included a pre-emption provision in 1976 device
amendments.17 The provision states that no state may impose
requirements that are different from or in addition to the
requirements FDA has imposed to assure the safety of a device.18
The possibility that a tort verdict could be viewed as a
“requirement” that adds to FDA requirements has been the focus of
several dozen cases, mainly in the federal courts.19 Because most
medical devices have entered the market through the 510k
“substantially equivalent” pathway, they have received less
scrutiny from FDA than most therapeutic drugs.
5. Dietary Supplements
Dietary supplements are products that appeal to consumers
who desire their promised physical effects, but typically avoid
16
17
18
19

Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
Id. at 470; 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2003).
21 U.S.C. § 360k(a).
Caraker v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 172 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (S.D. Ill. 2001).
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overt claims about their health benefits. They are not promoted as
medicines. In 1994 Congress, for only the second time in the
agency’s history, amended the law to relax FDA’s regulatory
oversight category of products, which it called “dietary
supplements.” 20
As a result of this legislation FDA has no authority to require
evidence of safety for any dietary supplement. Whatever testing of
these products is done, is done voluntarily by the manufacturer.
Like manufacturers of cosmetics and ordinary foods, the maker of
a dietary supplement cannot lie about the product. The FDA must
be notified if the manufacturer intends to market a dietary
ingredient that has never before been used in the United States.
However, this is simply a mechanism for alerting the agency so it
can invoke its ex post authority to punish misleading labeling or
harmful products. It does not provide FDA an opportunity to exert
ex ante controls.
CONCLUSION
The primary message of this short essay is easily summarized.
In deciding what, if any, weight to accord, in a tort suit, evidence
that a product manufacturer has complied with a regulatory
agency’s safety requirements for the product, a judge should
understand precisely what the agency has required and why. This
is sound advice in general and especially important in the context
of suits to recover for injuries caused by products regulated by
FDA. FDA-regulated products account for roughly one quarter of
the consumer economy, but they are subject to very different types
and levels of safety regulation. Some products—notably
therapeutic drugs—are carefully assessed for safety before they are
marketed and must comply with detailed requirements for design,
manufacture, labeling, and marketing, which reflect FDA’s
considered judgment about what precautions are appropriate and
consistent with the health benefits they provide. And drug
20

The drug combination Phen-fen is not a “dietary supplement.” It may be
promoted for its effects related to diet, e.g., as a weight-reducing agent, but it
was marketed with claims that made it, under the law, a drug. Phen-fen therefore
required the kind of FDA approval used for drugs.
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manufacturers are under a continuing duty to share with FDA all of
the information they learn about the effects of their products in use.
The case for allowing tort recovery—and for imposing an
additional level of deterrence—is much stronger for cosmetics and
most foods, which are not required to undergo premarket review
for safety and thus carry no implication that FDA has assessed and
attempted to control their risks. Dietary supplements are similarly
subject only to ex post regulation for safety. The regulatory
scheme for medical devices is more complicated and a judge
should be attentive to the different levels of safety review required
for new devices and for variations of familiar devices.
FDA-regulated products are frequently the target of liability
suits because they are universally consumed and because many
medical products have the capacity to injure as well as the ability
to cure or prevent injury. The latter are subject to unusual levels of
regulatory control, a reality that should elicit careful and informed
judicial assessment.

